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[581] 
Reflections on Riverisland:  
Reconsideration of the Fraud Exception  
to the Parol Evidence Rule 
 
Michelle P. LaRocca  
The California Supreme Court recently and unanimously overruled a longstanding 
precedent regarding the fraud exception to the Parol Evidence Rule in Riverisland Cold 
Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association. Prior to Riverisland, the 
Parol Evidence Rule did not allow evidence of promissory fraud. Now, evidence of 
promissory fraud at variance with the terms of the writing is admissible. Riverisland 
discourages fraudulent practices and creates a clear rule that is consistent with the 
language of California’s Parol Evidence Rule. It also recognizes the reality that many 
people do not read or understand the contracts that they sign and the psychological biases 
that play a role in perception and decisionmaking. The new precedent, however, exposes 
drafting parties to both intentionally and unintentionally fabricated claims from non-
drafting parties. Drafting parties are also at risk of unpredictable outcomes from juries 
who might be swayed by testimony of alleged fraudulent promises. Because the new 
standard favors non-drafting parties, the cost of contracting has shifted from non-drafting 
parties to drafting parties.  
 
This Note suggests that, to balance the costs of contracting between drafting and non-
drafting parties, meaningful assent to the specific terms at issue should be required for a 
party to be able to exclude evidence of alleged promissory fraud. Meaningful assent could 
be accomplished by having a one-page summary and disclaimer as to the key terms of the 
contract. If this summary/disclaimer page succeeds in being short, simple, and specific, 
then California courts should find mutual assent as to a contract’s terms and specific 




J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014. I would like to 
thank Professor Harry G. Prince for his suggestion of this topic and guidance throughout the writing 
process, Pat LaRocca for her inspiration of a practical solution, and Jim LaRocca for being my lifelong 
editor and supporter. Thank you also to the editors and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their 
hard work and insightful feedback. 
M - LaRocca_13 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:36 PM 
582 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:581 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 582 
I.  The Parol Evidence Rule and the Fraud Exception ..................... 584 
II.  PENDERGRASS: Evidence of Promissory Fraud Inconsistent 
with a Subsequent Writing Is Inadmissible Under the  
 Parol Evidence Rule .......................................................................... 588 
A.  Distinctions and Limitations: PENDERGRASS Explained ..... 590 
B.  Mixed Reviews: Reactions to PENDERGRASS ......................... 593 
III.  RIVERISLAND: Evidence of Promissory Fraud Is Always 
Admissible ............................................................................................. 596 
IV.  Reflections on RIVERISLAND ............................................................... 598 
A.  Problems with Allowing Promissory Fraud that 
Contradicts the Written Agreement .................................. 599 
1.  Permits Unintentionally False Claims ................................ 600 
2.  Encourages Intentionally Fabricated Claims .................... 601 
3.  Risks Unpredictable Outcomes From Juries ..................... 603 
B.  Positive Effects of Allowing Promissory Fraud that 
Contradicts the Written Agreement .................................. 606 
1.  Recognizes Reality: No One Reads and Fully 
Understands Contracts ........................................................ 606 
2.  Discourages Fraudulent Practices of Drafting Parties 
and Recognizes Legislative Intent ...................................... 608 
3.  Acknowledges Psychological Tendencies ......................... 608 





On January 14, 2013, the California Supreme Court overruled a 
longstanding precedent regarding promissory fraud. In the 1935 case, 
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v. Pendergrass, 
the California Supreme Court declared inadmissible evidence of 
promissory fraud—a promise made without the intent to perform—made 
prior to and inconsistent with the subsequent written agreement.1 The 
court’s unanimous decision in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-
Madera Production Credit Association overturned Pendergrass and 
 
 1. 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935). 
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declared that evidence of promissory fraud that is at variance with the 
terms of the writing is admissible.2 
Prior to Riverisland, Pendergrass was highly criticized and difficult 
to apply. Two of the main criticisms were that the Pendergrass decision 
was inconsistent with the Parol Evidence Rule,3 codified at section 1856 
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, and its holding was not based 
on the precedent of the time.4 In addition, the Restatement of Contracts, 
most treatises, and a majority of other jurisdictions recognized that 
evidence of fraud will be allowed despite the Parol Evidence Rule.5 
Another criticism was that Pendergrass provided drafting parties a 
loophole to make misrepresentations and then disclaim them later in 
writing.6 Thus, scholars were concerned that Pendergrass encouraged, or 
at least tolerated, fraudulent practices. 
Riverisland alleviates many of these concerns. First, the decision 
recognizes the realities of everyday life: many people do not read or 
understand the contracts that they sign. Second, Riverisland creates a 
clear rule consistent with the language of section 1856. The rule is also 
consistent with the intent of section 1856: to give recourse against a 
drafting party’s fraudulent misrepresentations and, thus, discourage fraud. 
Third, application of Riverisland will acknowledge the psychological 
tendencies that play a role in an individual’s perception and decisionmaking. 
People are generally optimistic when entering into agreements, tending 
to look for evidence that supports their preexisting beliefs about 
potential dealings while ignoring contradictory information. When a 
drafting party presents a contract to the non-drafting party, the non-
drafting party feels pressure to sign. Taking the time to read it line-by-
line, let alone asking to take the time to have a lawyer review it, feels 
 
 2. 291 P.3d 316, 325 (Cal. 2013). 
 3.  See Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Justin Sweet, 
Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 877, 887 (1961); see also Pac. State 
Bank v. Greene, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 739, 750–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 4. Sweet, supra note 3, at 885.  
 5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 214 (2012); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 530 
(2012); 6 Peter Linzer, Corbin on Contracts § 25.20[A] (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2010); 
2 E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.4 (3d ed. 2004); 2 Richard A. Lord, 
Williston on Contracts § 33:17 (4th ed. 2012). See, e.g., Touche Ross, Ltd. v. Filipek, 778 P.2d 721 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Pinnacle Peak Developers v. TRW Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1980); Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. Nat’l Metal Abrasive Co., 101 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1939) (finding 
that the plaintiff had been “induced to conclude an agreement by fraudulent concealment of existing 
facts and by promises, implied if not expressed, made with no present intention of performing. In the 
allegations of inducement we find no challenge to the terms of the contract impermissible under the 
parol evidence rule”). 
 6. See Alicia W. Macklin, Note, The Fraud Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule: Necessary 
Protection for Fraud Victims or Loophole for Clever Parties?, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 809, 810 (2009). 
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uncomfortable for the non-drafting party because it shows distrust of the 
drafting party. 
The Riverisland standard favors non-drafting parties by shifting the 
cost of contracting from non-drafting parties to the drafting parties. 
Allowing parol evidence of alleged fraudulent promises presents a number 
of problems for litigants. First, honestly made but erroneous claims from 
non-drafting parties regarding prior statements from drafting parties now 
have a greater chance of making it past the pleading stage. A non-drafter 
might bring a claim truly believing that the drafter committed fraud when 
she actually misremembers what occurred. Second, Riverisland encourages 
intentionally fabricated claims. A party who is unhappy with her 
agreement might attempt to void her contract by alleging that the drafting 
party made fraudulent misrepresentations prior to signing the final writing. 
Third, Riverisland could lead to unpredictable outcomes from triers of 
fact who might be biased by evidence of alleged fraudulent promises. 
Jurors come to trial with different backgrounds and beliefs that impact 
their perceptions of subjective evidence offered by the parties and, 
ultimately, their verdicts. 
To balance the costs of contracting between the parties, meaningful 
assent to the specific terms at issue should be required for a party to be 
able to exclude evidence of prior fraudulent misrepresentations. 
Meaningful assent could be accomplished by having a one-page summary 
and disclaimer of the key terms of the contract. Similar to New York 
decisional law, under which drafting parties can obtain meaningful assent 
in the form of a signature next to specific disclaimers of prior 
representations, drafting parties could specifically disclaim prior 
representations regarding particular terms on this summary/disclaimer 
page. 
Part I of this Note examines the Parol Evidence Rule and its fraud 
exception. Part II discusses Pendergrass and the reactions to and criticisms 
of it. Part III summarizes the recent California Supreme Court Riverisland 
decision. Part IV analyzes the implications of its holding compared to 
Pendergrass’s holding and discusses the practical realities and behavioral 
psychological implications of each. Finally, Part V discusses a possible 
solution to some of the problems that Riverisland presents. 
I.  The Parol Evidence Rule and the Fraud Exception 
The Parol Evidence Rule (the “PER”) is codified at section 1856 of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure.7 The PER “prohibits the 
 
 7. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1856 (West 2013) (“(a) Terms set forth in a writing intended by the 
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may 
not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement. 
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introduction of any extrinsic evidence (oral or written) to vary or add to 
the terms of an integrated written instrument (a contract, deed, or will).”8 
Once the parties put their terms into a written contract, the writing 
becomes the agreement and the final written terms of the contract 
supersede any prior oral or written negotiations.9 As long as the non-
drafting party has the general knowledge that a set of terms exists within 
the contract, a court will likely find that party to have consented to the 
agreement.10 Courts will usually find that a non-drafting party has given 
such “blanket assent,”11 even if there is no evidence that the party 
specifically assented to each individual term.12 Thus, the court will likely 
find that a party that signs a written contract has agreed to the terms in 
the contract, even if she does not know the specifics of those terms.13 
The PER bars evidence of prior writings and prior or 
contemporaneous oral agreements.14 Under the PER, therefore, later-in-
time writings supersede any conflicting prior agreements, oral or written.15 
The PER is designed to protect the parties’ final understandings, intents, 
and agreements that have been expressly recorded in a contract.16 
 
(b) The terms set forth in a writing described in subdivision (a) may be explained or supplemented by 
evidence of consistent additional terms unless the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreement. (c) The terms set forth in a writing described in 
subdivision (a) may be explained or supplemented by course of dealing or usage of trade or by course 
of performance. (d) The court shall determine whether the writing is intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein and whether the 
writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. 
(e) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the pleadings, this section does 
not exclude evidence relevant to that issue. (f) Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in 
dispute, this section does not exclude evidence relevant to that issue. (g) This section does not exclude 
other evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made or to which it relates, as 
defined in Section 1860, or to explain an extrinsic ambiguity or otherwise interpret the terms of the 
agreement, or to establish illegality or fraud. (h) As used in this section, the term agreement includes 
deeds and wills, as well as contracts between parties.”). The corresponding section in the California 
Civil Code is section 1625: “The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be 
written or not, supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or 
accompanied the execution of the instrument.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1625 (West 2013). 
 8. 2 B.E. Witkin, Cal. Evid. Documentary Evidence § 60, at 199 (5th ed. 2012). 
 9. Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 83 P.3d 497, 502 (Cal. 2004). 
 10. Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law 
and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 51, 59 (2013). 
 11. Id.; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370–71 (1960). 
 12. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 461 (2002) (“Despite criticism, Llewellyn’s notion of ‘blanket assent’ dominates 
contemporary judicial treatment of standard-form provisions. ‘Blanket assent’ is best understood to mean 
that, although consumers do not read standard terms, so long as their formal presentation and substance 
are reasonable, consumers comprehend the existence of the terms and agree to be bound to them.”). 
 13. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 59. 
 14. Casa Herrera, 83 P.3d at 502–03. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
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Consciously or subconsciously, parties generally intend for their later 
agreements to supersede earlier discussed terms in their negotiations.17 
Thus, the PER makes sure that this final agreement is not subject to 
change unless both parties agree to a modification.18 
One policy consideration underlying the PER is based on the 
assumption that “written evidence is more accurate than human 
memory.”19 Because the court will be interpreting written words instead of 
alleged past discussion, this also provides predictability in how a court will 
interpret a contract when there is disagreement between the parties. In 
addition, without such a rule, courts and scholars fear that evidence of 
intentional or unintentional fabrications by interested parties might 
mislead jurors.20 The PER is designed to protect against such concerns. 
In addition, a common law principle provides that parties have a 
“duty to read” contracts that they sign.21 As the celebrated contracts 
scholar and treatise author Arthur Corbin stated, a “party who signs an 
instrument manifests assent to it and may not later complain about not 
reading or not understanding the instrument.”22 Without a duty to read 
and the existence of the PER, parties could simply avoid liability by 
claiming not to have read or understood their contracts.23 This would lead 
to written contracts that have virtually no meaning. 
In determining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, courts generally 
undertake a multi-step process.24 First, the court must determine whether 
the PER applies. To make this determination, the court considers 
whether there was a final writing and whether the parties intended that 
writing to be an integration25—“a complete and final expression of the 
parties’ agreement.”26 The PER only applies to an agreement that is 
integrated.27 If the writing is a final integration, the PER bars any evidence 
of collateral agreements.28 An integration might also be “partial” where 
the parties intend the writing to be final but do not intend it to include all 
 
 17. Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Supplementing Written Agreements: Restating the Parol Evidence Rule 
in Terms of Credibility and Relative Fault, 34 Emory L.J. 93, 94 (1985) (“[P]articipants in negotiations 
typically intend, consciously or subliminally, to have a resulting written agreement, an ‘integration,’ 
evidence terms finally agreed to in discharge of those proposed, discussed, or tentatively assented to in 
the dickering process.”). 
 18. See Casa Herrera, 83 P.3d at 503. 
 19. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). 
 20. See, e.g., id.; Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L.J. 603, 608 (1944). 
 21. See 7 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts §§ 28.38, 29.8, 29.12 (rev. ed. 2012). 
 22. Id. § 28.38. 
 23. See id. § 29.8. 
 24. Witkin, supra note 8, § 60, at 200. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
 27. Shivers v. Liberty Bldg.-Loan Ass’n, 106 P.2d 4, 6 (Cal. 1940). 
 28. Banco Do Brasil, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 886. 
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the details of their agreement.29 If the writing is partially integrated, then 
the PER applies only to the integrated part of the agreement.30 
Second, the court must determine whether the evidence is consistent 
or inconsistent with the writing.31 If the extrinsic evidence constitutes a 
consistent collateral agreement or is being used to interpret the terms of 
the agreement, then the evidence is admissible.32 If the extrinsic evidence 
is used to vary the terms of the final writing, then the evidence is barred.33 
Third, the court looks at whether the extrinsic inconsistent evidence 
falls under one of the exceptions to the PER.34 Extrinsic evidence is 
admissible when there is a mistake in the writing, when the validity of the 
contract is in dispute, to interpret the terms of the writing, or to establish 
illegality or fraud.35 This Note focuses on the fraud exception, which 
includes actual or constructive fraud—intentional or reckless false 
representations that induce a party’s reliance and cause economic 
damages.36 Under section 1572 of the California Civil Code, “actual 
fraud” consists of a false representation committed by a party to the 
contract with the intent to deceive the other party about the agreement 
or induce her to enter into it.37 Section 1572 lists a variety of fraudulent 
acts including “[t]he suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one 
who does not believe it to be true; . . . A promise made without any 
intention of performing it; or, . . . Any other act fitted to deceive.”38 
Under section 1573 of the California Civil Code, “constructive fraud” 
includes any breach of duty, without fraudulent intent, that misleads a 
person to the other’s advantage.39 
When a party alleges fraud or illegality, California decisional law 
permits evidence of pre-contractual misrepresentations that vary or 
contradict the written agreement.40 Evidence of fraud is admissible even 
if the contract contains a merger clause stating that the written document 
 
 29. Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, 
Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Witkin, supra note 8, § 60, at 200. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1856(e)–(g) (West 2012). 
 35. Id. § 1856(g). 
 36. Cal. Civ. Code § 1572 (West 2012) (defining “actual fraud”); id. § 1573 (defining “constructive 
fraud”). 
 37. Id. § 1572. 
 38. Id. (emphasis added); see id. § 1710 (“A deceit . . . is either: (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that 
which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not 
true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; (3) The suppression of a fact, by 
one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for 
want of communication of that fact; or, (4) A promise, made without any intention of performing it.”). 
 39. Id. § 1573 (emphasis added). 
 40. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1291 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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embodies the entire agreement41 and any right to introduce prior oral 
representations is waived.42 
The fraud exception can be justified in three ways. First, if fraud is 
present, there cannot be mutual assent between the parties.43 Extrinsic 
evidence of fraud does not vary the terms of the contract, but rather 
shows that no legally binding contract was made in the first place.44 Thus, 
because there was never a contact to begin with, the PER does not 
apply.45 Second, as a practical matter, if a contract were voidable due to 
fraud, the fraud would likely not appear in the actual written document.46 
Thus, the exception allows extrinsic evidence to prove fraud, even if 
fraud cannot be found on the face of the contract. Third, parol evidence 
of fraud is allowed because, otherwise, parties would be able to engage in 
fraud or illegality without fear of repercussion.47 Parties may not use the 
PER as a shield to commit fraudulent acts and escape liability.48 Despite 
these policy considerations and the language in section 1856, which 
specifically and broadly permits evidence of fraud, the California 
Supreme Court in Pendergrass limited the fraud exception.49 
II.  PENDERGRASS: Evidence of Promissory Fraud Inconsistent with 
a Subsequent Writing Is Inadmissible Under the Parol Evidence 
Rule 
[T]o admit evidence of extrinsic agreements would be to open the door 
to all evils that the parol evidence rule was designed to prevent. 
—Judge P. Tyler50 
In 1935, Pendergrass limited the fraud exception to the PER and 
held that evidence of promissory fraud that was inconsistent with the 
written agreement was not allowed.51 In 1928, the defendant borrowers, 
T.S. Pendergrass and his son, purchased a ranch subject to a $20,000 trust 
deed from plaintiff Bank of America.52 In January 1932, the 
Pendergrasses fell behind on their payments.53 They negotiated with the 
 
 41. Fleury v. Ramacciotti, 67 P.2d 339, 340 (Cal. 1937). 
 42. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 789 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P. 342, 345 (Cal. 1928). 
 43. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal & Harry G. Prince, Problems in Contract Law: 
Cases and Materials 392 (6th ed. 2007). 
 44. Wiberg v. Barnum, 278 P. 871, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929). 
 45. Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra note 43, at 392. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Macklin, supra note 6, at 810. 
 48. Halagan v. Ohanesian, 64 Cal. Rptr. 792, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
 49. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935). 
 50. Lindemann v. Coryell, 212 P. 47, 49 (Cal. 1922). 
 51. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662. 
 52. Id. at 660, 662. 
 53. Id. at 661. 
M - LaRocca_13 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:36 PM 
February 2014] REFLECTIONS ON RIVERISLAND 589 
 
bank for a new demand note for $4750, secured by chattel and crop 
mortgages and payable on demand.54 Soon after these documents were 
executed, the bank demanded payment.55 When the Pendergrasses did 
not pay, the bank seized all of the property covered by the mortgages 
and sued to enforce the note.56 
The Pendergrasses raised two defenses in their answer: (1) the bank 
could only enforce the note by judicial foreclosure because the note was 
secured by a chattel mortgage, and (2) the note was obtained by fraud.57 
The Pendergrasses alleged that the bank had promised that they would 
not interfere with their farming for the rest of the year and that the 
defendants would not have to make any payments on their debt until the 
1932 crop was ready for harvest because the proceeds from the crop 
would constitute payment.58 The Pendergrasses asserted that the bank 
made these promises fraudulently to obtain the new note and additional 
collateral and never intended to follow through with them.59 
The trial judge directed the judgment for the bank.60 The district court 
of appeal reversed because the Pendergrasses’ opening statement fixed a 
pleading error regarding the note only being enforceable by judicial 
foreclosure.61 Although unnecessary because the judgment was already 
reversed, the court then addressed the Pendergrasses’ second claim of 
promissory fraud, finding that it could be used as a defense.62 
The Supreme Court of California reversed the intermediate appellate 
court decision regarding promissory fraud.63 The court considered whether 
the promise by the bank not to collect payments until the Pendergrasses 
sold their 1932 crop would be admissible evidence.64 The court also 
analyzed whether such a fraudulent promise was subject to the PER.65 In 
its analysis, the court relied on the Virginia case, Towner v. Lucas’ 
Executor, which stated: “It is reasoning in a circle, to argue that fraud is 
made out, when it is shown by oral testimony that the obligee 
contemporaneously with the execution of a bond, promised not to enforce 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 659–60. 
 58. Id. at 660. 
 59. Id. at 660–61. 
 60. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. Pendergrass, 35 P.2d 346, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934). 
 61. Id. at 349. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662. 
 64. Id. at 661. 
 65. Id. (“Is such a promise the subject of parol proof for the purpose of establishing fraud as a 
defense to the action or by way of cancelling the note, assuming, of course, that it can be properly 
coupled with proof that it was made without any intention of performing it?”). 
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it.”66 The court in Towner argued that allowing such oral evidence would 
nullify the PER, which was created, in part, to prevent non-drafting 
parties from subsequently fabricating claims that the drafting party made 
fraudulent prior misrepresentations.67 
The court also cited Lindemann v. Coryell.68 In Lindemann, the 
court held that parol evidence of fraud could not be used when a person 
“has it in his power to guard in advance against any and all consequences 
of a subsequent change of conduct by the person with whom he is 
dealing.”69 The Lindemann court stated that admitting such evidence 
would negate the purpose of the PER.70 
The California Supreme Court concluded that parol evidence 
offered to show fraud “must tend to establish some independent fact or 
representation, some fraud in the procurement of the instrument, or 
some breach of confidence concerning its use, and not a promise directly 
at variance with the promise of the writing.”71 If the alleged oral promise 
is inconsistent with the writing—even if the promise was made with 
fraudulent intent—the evidence is inadmissible.72 When the party has it in 
her power to read the contract, thereby guarding against any fraudulent 
misrepresentations, she has the burden to do so.73 Allowing evidence of 
any prior or contemporaneous promises that conflict with the writing 
would negate the PER.74 Thus, although the court reversed on the judicial 
foreclosure issue, it found that the evidence of promissory fraud 
inconsistent with the writing should not be allowed.75 
A. Distinctions and Limitations: PENDERGRASS Explained 
Courts and scholars have interpreted Pendergrass in a variety of 
ways, finding numerous distinctions between the types of fraud and 
limitations on what evidence is admissible. There are distinctions 
between “promises” and “facts,” “fraud in the execution” and “fraud in 
the inducement,” and “consistent” and “inconsistent” terms. Pendergrass 
is a promissory fraud case (with inconsistent terms) or a fraud in the 
inducement case. These distinctions are important to note because the 
Riverisland court could have easily found the case to be one of fraud in 
the execution and, therefore, did not need to overrule Pendergrass. 
 
 66. 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 705, 716 (Va. 1857). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662 (citing Lindemann v. Coryell, 212 P. 47, 48 (Cal. 1922)). 
 69. Id. at 48–49. 
 70. Id. at 49. 
 71. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 661. 
 72. Id. at 662. 
 73. Lindemann, 212 P. at 48–49. 
 74. Towner v. Lucas’ Ex’r, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 705, 716 (Va. 1857). 
 75. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 661. 
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Promissory fraud is a promise that is made without the intent to 
perform.76 Under Pendergrass, evidence of promissory fraud is not 
admissible when it varies or contradicts the terms of the written 
promise.77 The PER will not allow evidence of “D promised me X” when 
the contract states that X will not be given.78 Evidence of promissory 
fraud is admissible, however, if it is consistent with or independent of the 
written promise.79 For example, in Simmons v. California Institute of 
Technology, a written agreement stated the form of payment but did not 
specify the money’s required use.80 The alleged fraudulent promise was 
that the money was to be used exclusively for a specific type of research.81 
Thus, the written agreement dealt with the form of payment and the 
promise dealt with the use of the money, which were two “wholly different 
matters.”82 The court held that these representations were not at variance 
with the writing but were independent of it and, therefore, admissible.83 
Misrepresentations of fact regarding a present existing fact or the 
physical content of the written agreement are always admissible.84 
Misrepresentations of fact regarding a present existing fact would be 
classic, actual fraud. This could include misrepresentations of fact during 
negotiations.85 For example, a real estate broker representing that land 
could be divided into two separate properties, when zoning laws actually 
prohibited splitting the land, would be a misrepresentation of a present 
existing fact.86 
Misrepresentation of fact regarding the physical content of the 
written agreement occurs when a party knows the type of document that 
she signed but the drafter said that the writing contained terms different 
from those actually included.87 For example, misrepresentation occurs 
when the non-drafter knows that she is signing a loan agreement but the 
 
 76. Cal. Civ. Code § 1572 (West 2012). 
 77. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662; Macklin, supra note 6, at 816. 
 78. Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 (Cal. 1996); see Korobkin, supra 
note 10, at 68. 
 79. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 661; Macklin, supra note 6, at 816. 
 80. 209 P.2d 581, 587 (Cal. 1949). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779, 798 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989). The defendant in this case made various promises within its brochures while also making 
factual representations. Id. For example, the defendant promised that“[u]nder crash loading 
conditions, the main landing gear is designed to break away from the wing structure without rupturing 
fuel lines or the integral wing fuel tank,” and that “[t]he [wing] support structure is designed to a higher 
strength than the gear to prevent fuel tank rupture due to an accidental landing gear overload.” Id. The 
court held that these were factual misrepresentations and, thus, admissible to show fraud. Id. at 799. 
 86. See Manderville v. PCG & S Group, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 87. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 68. 
M - LaRocca_13 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:36 PM 
592 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:581 
 
terms in the document are materially different than what the drafting 
loan officer had represented.88  
In addition, courts have distinguished between fraud in the execution 
and fraud in the inducement. Fraud in the execution relates to the 
establishment or inception of the agreement where a party is “deceived as 
to the nature of his act”—either the party did not intend to enter into a 
contract or does not know the nature and character of what she was 
signing.89 For example, the drafter asks the non-drafter to sign what the 
drafter says is a receipt for items delivered, but is actually a contract for 
the sale of more items.90 The PER allows, and Pendergrass did not 
prohibit, evidence of “D said that the contract promises X” when the 
contract promises Y instead.91 In such a case, because there is no mutual 
assent, there is no legal contract.92 Thus, the contract is void and subject 
to rescission by the party that was deceived.93 
With fraud in the inducement, on the other hand, the party knows 
the nature and character of what he is signing “but his consent is induced 
by fraud.”94 For example, making a fraudulent statement that the roof on 
a house had been repaired to get homebuyers to sign a contract would 
constitute fraud in the inducement. In such cases, the parties mutually 
assented and formed a contract, but it might be voidable by rescission 
because of the fraud.95 However, under Pendergrass, the PER does not 
allow evidence of “D promised me X” if X was not included in the 
contract.96 
Finally, there is a distinction between “consistent” and “inconsistent” 
terms. In Coast Bank v. Holmes, the bank sued the borrower to recover 
the money owed on its promissory note.97 The borrower alleged that the 
bank had orally promised (1) not to enforce the note, but to cancel it if the 
parcel of land was foreclosed upon, (2) to only demand payment on the 
note if the parcel was sold for enough money to enable the borrower to 
pay off the note, and (3) to protect the borrower’s security interest.98 The 
court ultimately held that the first two promises were inconsistent terms 
 
 88. See Pac. State Bank v. Greene, 1 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 89. Ford v. Shearson Lehman Am. Express, Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 895, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 90. Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra note 43, at 392. 
 91. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 68. 
 92. Speck v. Wylie, 36 P.2d 618, 619 (Cal. 1934). 
 93. Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding 
that evidence of fraud “is admissible in an action for rescission because it does not go to contradict the 
terms of the parties’ integrated agreement, but to show instead that the purported instrument has no 
legal effect”). 
 94. Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 (Cal. 1996). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935). 
 97. Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
 98. Id. at 34–35. 
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and that the third promise was consistent with the terms of the note,99 but 
the court was very critical of the “consistent-inconsistent” distinction.100 
The court noted that it is contradictory to have a rule that states that 
promissory fraud can invalidate an agreement but then exclude evidence 
of such fraud when the promise is at variance with the written terms of 
the agreement.101 Given the numerous distinctions between the types of 
fraud and limitations on admissible evidence, courts have interpreted and 
applied Pendergrass in a variety of ways. 
B. Mixed Reviews: Reactions to PENDERGRASS 
Subsequent applications of Pendergrass have varied. Some courts 
have followed the decision,102 some have stretched the meaning of what is 
“consistent” within a writing,103 and some have simply ignored it.104 
Courts that have followed Pendergrass found that there are rational 
policy reasons for limiting the fraud exception.105 For example, in Price v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, the First District Court of Appeal noted that too 
broad of a fraud exception would undermine the policy considerations of 
the PER.106 An overbroad exception would possibly “allow parties to 
litigate disputes over the meaning of contract terms armed with an 
arsenal of tort remedies inappropriate to the resolution of commercial 
disputes.”107 The court also noted, however, that favoring the policy 
concerns of the PER compromised tort principles.108 The court concluded 
that the Pendergrass court made a rational policy decision that should 
 
 99. Id. at 36 (“There was substantial evidence to support the court’s findings that the latter 
promise, the prime bargained for assurance which induced Holmes to execute the note, was falsely 
made. That the Bank had no intention of performing that promise when it made it may be inferred 
from the failure to perform and from the dubious authority of a bank to make such a promise.”). 
 100. Id. at 35–36. 
 101. See id. at 36; see also Sweet, supra note 3, at 885. 
 102. See, e.g., Duncan v. McCaffrey Group, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); West 
v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. 
Rptr. 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Lamb Fin. Co., Inc., 3 Cal. 
Rptr. 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); Abbot v. Stevens, 284 P.2d 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Newmark v. H & 
H Prod. Mfg. Co., 274 P.2d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). 
 103. See, e.g., Morris v. Harbor Boat Bldg. Co., 247 P.2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Simmons v. Cal. 
Inst. of Tech., 209 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1949). 
 104. See, e.g., Chastain v. Belmont, 271 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1954); Willson v. Niagara Duplicator Co., 
198 P.2d 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948). 
 105. See, e.g., Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“Moreover, 
despite scholarly criticisms, the decision is based on an entirely defensible decision favoring the policy 
considerations underlying the parol evidence over those supporting a fraud cause of action.”); Banco 
Do Brasil, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (“Over fifty years ago, our Supreme Court made a very defensible 
policy choice which favored the considerations underlying the parol evidence rule over those 
supporting a fraud cause of action.”). 
 106. Price, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 746. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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only be reconsidered by the California Supreme Court.109 In Banco Do 
Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., the Second District Court of Appeal agreed 
with the reasoning in Price and even stated that Pendergrass made the 
“better” policy choice of the two alternatives, favoring the PER over 
favoring tort principles.110 
Some secondary sources have also agreed with Pendergrass’s 
interpretation of the PER. For example, John Wigmore, a legal scholar 
and expert in evidence, stated that a party’s intent not to perform a 
promise should not be considered “fraudulent” as it relates to the PER.111 
Although critical of Pendergrass, a recent law review note by Alicia 
Macklin of the University of Southern California Gould School of Law 
favors the limiting of the PER’s fraud exception.112 In her note, Macklin 
even advocates for a stricter promissory fraud rule.113 She argues that there 
should be varying degrees of the fraud exception for certain contracts and 
parties—e.g., more sophisticated parties versus less sophisticated parties.114 
However, Pendergrass has also received much criticism. The main 
criticism is that the decision is inconsistent with California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1856,115 which broadly permits extrinsic evidence that 
establishes illegality or fraud.116 The statute does not contemplate any 
limitations or distinctions. Thus, it is inconsistent to have a rule that states 
that promissory fraud can invalidate an agreement but then not allow 
evidence of such fraud just because the promise varies from the written 
terms of the contract.117 
Two years after Pendergrass, the California Supreme Court 
completely ignored Pendergrass when it decided Fleury v. Ramacciotti.118 
 
 109. Id 
 110. Banco Do Brasil, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 892. 
 111. Bank of Am. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935). But see Sweet, 
supra note 3, at 884 (arguing that the Pendergrass court might have been erroneously relying on 
Wigmore because “Wigmore quoted the case to discredit a former Pennsylvania rule that it was fraud 
to insist on a writing when there had been an earlier oral agreement to the contrary, a rule that is 
almost universally rejected. He did not cite it to support his view that only evidence of factual fraud is 
exempted from the parol evidence rule, although there was dicta to that effect in the case”). 
 112. Macklin, supra note 6, at 837. 
 113. Id. (“Instead of admitting evidence of alleged promissory fraud that is consistent with or 
independent of the written agreement, courts should either follow the more strict PER standard for 
complete integrations—barring evidence that varies from or adds to the written agreement—or follow 
a ‘substantial variance’ test. While critics of the already narrow Pendergrass rule assert that the focus 
needs to be on the ‘right to relief from fraud,’ fraud is a lesser concern for sophisticated parties, who 
are in a position to protect themselves in a contract negotiation.”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Sweet, supra note 3, at 
887; see also Pac. State Bank v. Greene, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 739, 750–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 116. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1856 (West 2013). 
 117. Coast Bank, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 35–36. 
 118. 67 P.2d 339 (Cal. 1937). 
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In Fleury, the defendant defaulted on a note and the plaintiff let the 
statute of limitations run on his potential action against the defendant.119 
The defendant then signed a renewal note.120 When the defendant again 
defaulted, the plaintiff entered a deficiency judgment against the 
defendant.121 The defendant alleged that he told the plaintiff—and the 
plaintiff agreed—that the defendant would only sign a renewal note and 
waive the statute of limitations if no deficiency judgment would be 
entered against him.122 The defendant alleged that he did not read the 
contract but signed relying on the plaintiff’s representations that it 
included provisions that prevented a deficiency judgment against him.123 
The court stated that “fraud may always be shown to defeat the effect of 
an agreement.”124 Thus, the court held that the PER did not bar evidence 
of fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the content of the contract, 
when those misrepresentations induced the party to sign the contract.125 
Therefore, the court reached the complete opposite result of 
Pendergrass. 
Notably, in 1977, the California Law Revision Commission did not 
take Pendergrass into account when it modified the PER statute.126 The 
Commission suggested that the Legislature review three cases in making 
its decision about modifications to the rule;127 Pendergrass was not 
included, and the Commission cited Coast Bank, which is very critical of 
Pendergrass, in its discussion of the PER.128 The Legislature adopted the 
Commission’s proposed revision and did not change the language of the 
PER as it relates to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of fraud. 129 
In addition, most scholars in their treatises recognize that the PER 
broadly allows evidence of fraud without a Pendergrass-like restriction. 
Corbin, along with E. Allen Farnsworth and Samuel Williston, who were 
also contracts scholars and treatise authors, did not put restrictions on 
the admissibility of evidence of fraud.130 The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts section 214 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 530 
 
 119. Id. at 339. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 340 
 125. Id. 
 126. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 321 (Cal. 2013). 
 127. Id.; see Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. 
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
 128. Recommendation Relating to Parol Evidence Rule, in California Law Revision Commission 
Annual Report 147, 148 (1977). 
 129. Id. at 152; see 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 150, § 1. 
 130. Linzer, supra note 5, § 25.20[A]; Farnsworth, supra note 5, § 7.4; Lord, supra note 5, 
§ 33:17. 
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also do not put any limitations on the fraud exception.131 Finally, a 
majority of other jurisdictions also allow parol evidence of fraud.132 
III.  RIVERISLAND: Evidence of Promissory Fraud Is Always 
Admissible 
We respect the principle of stare decisis, but reconsideration of a 
poorly reasoned opinion is nevertheless appropriate. 
—Justice Corrigan133 
On January 14, 2013, the California Supreme Court overruled 
Pendergrass in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera 
Production Credit Association.134 The PER now permits evidence of 
promissory fraud that is at variance with the terms of the writing. 
In Riverisland, plaintiffs Lance and Pamela Workman failed to 
make a required payment on their loan to defendant Fresno-Madera 
Production Credit Association (the “Credit Association”).135 In March 
2007, the Workmans restructured their debt in an agreement with the 
Credit Association.136 The written agreement stated that the loan would 
be extended three months with eight of the Workmans’ properties as 
collateral.137 The Workmans alleged, however, that when they met with 
the Credit Association’s vice president before the agreement was signed, 
he told them that the Credit Association would extend their loan by two 
years for the additional collateral of two of the Workmans’ properties.138 
The Workmans claimed that when they signed the contract the vice 
president again assured them of these terms.139 The Workmans stated 
that they did not read the contract but signed the places where the vice 
president had tabbed for signature.140 The Workmans initialed the pages 
with the legal descriptions of each of the eight properties.141 The 
Workmans failed to make the requisite payments and, in March 2008, the 
 
 131. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 214 (2012); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 530 
(2012). 
 132. See, e.g., Touche Ross, Ltd. v. Filipek, 778 P.2d 721 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Pinnacle Peak 
Developers v. TRW Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. Nat’l 
Metal Abrasive Co., 101 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1939) (finding that the plaintiff had been “induced to 
conclude an agreement by fraudulent concealment of existing facts and by promises, implied if not 
expressed, made with no present intention of performing. In the allegations of inducement we find no 
challenge to the terms of the contract impermissible under the parol evidence rule”). 
 133. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 322 (Cal. 2013). 
 134. Id. at 325. 
 135. Id. at 317. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 318. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 317. 
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Credit Association recorded a notice of default.142 The Workmans 
eventually repaid the loan, “but they had to sell their properties at 
severely reduced prices.”143 After being repaid, the Credit Association 
dismissed its foreclosure proceedings.144 
The Workmans then sued the Credit Association, seeking damages 
for negligent misrepresentation and fraud.145 In response to these 
allegations, the Credit Association argued that the PER barred any 
evidence of terms that contradicted the written agreement.146 The 
Workmans argued that these misrepresentations fell under the fraud 
exception to the PER.147 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Credit 
Association.148 Relying on Pendergrass, the trial court held that the fraud 
exception did not include parol evidence that was inconsistent with the 
written agreement.149 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that Pendergrass was limited 
to promissory fraud cases.150 The appellate court reasoned that the alleged 
false statements by the vice president were “factual misrepresentations” 
about the contents of the contract and were thus beyond the scope of 
Pendergrass.151 The California Supreme Court then granted the Credit 
Association’s petition for review.152 In the Workmans’ brief, they argued 
that the appellate court’s holding was correct: theirs was a case of fraud 
in the execution and Pendergrass did not apply.153 Alternatively, the 
Workmans argued that, if the court wanted to reconsider Pendergrass, 
there were good reasons to overrule it.154 
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by looking at the 
PER, finding that the language of section 1856 is “broad” and 
“unqualified.”155 The court then discussed the reactions to and criticisms of 
the ruling in Pendergrass.156 In reconsidering Pendergrass, the court 
 
 142. Id. at 318. 
 143. Reply Brief on the Merits at 5, Riverisland, 291 P.3d 316 (No. S190581), 2011 WL 5075465, at 
*5. 
 144. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 318. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Reply Brief on the Merits at 7, Riverisland, 291 P.3d 316 (No. S190581), 2011 WL 5075465, at 
*6–7. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 319. 
 156. Id. at 320–22; see supra Part II.B. 
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considered whether its limitation on the fraud exception was necessary to 
serve the goals of the PER.157 
First, the court looked at the law at the time that Pendergrass was 
decided.158 The court cited six California Supreme Court cases prior to 
Pendergrass that held that PER, without qualification, allowed evidence 
of fraud.159 The court also looked to the 1898 case Langley v. Rodriguez160 
and found that the broad fraud exception applied in promissory fraud 
cases as well.161 The court noted that it confirmed this view of promissory 
fraud in Fleury v. Ramacciotti.162 Thus, the court found that Pendergrass 
was out of touch with California law.163 
Second, the court looked at the authority that the Pendergrass court 
cited in its opinion.164 The court found that the authorities relied upon did 
not support its decision.165 The court noted that Towner, the Virginia case 
quoted in the opinion, was not a promissory fraud case, and the 
California cases cited also did not consider the PER’s fraud exception.166 
The court stated that “Pendergrass was an aberration,” and held that its 
limitation on the fraud exception to the PER was not justified.167 Thus, 
Pendergrass was out of touch with California law, not based on relevant 
precedent, and inconsistent with the terms of section 1856.168 
Finally, the court noted that the intent element of promissory fraud 
required a showing from the plaintiffs that their reliance on the 
defendant’s misrepresentation was reasonable.169 The court declined to 
address this issue, as neither the trial court nor the appellate court 
addressed it.170 The court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, 
holding that the PER does not bar evidence of fraudulent promises at 
variance with the terms of the written agreement.171 
IV.  Reflections on RIVERISLAND 
[I]t was never intended that the parol evidence rule should be used as a 
shield to prevent the proof of fraud. 
 
 157. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 322–23. 
 158. Id. at 323. 
 159. Id. 
 160. 55 P. 406 (Cal. 1898). 
 161. Id.; see generally 55 P. 406 (Cal. 1898). 
 162. Id.; see generally Fleury v. Ramacciotti, 67 P.2d 339 (Cal. 1937). 
 163. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 325. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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—Justice Tyler172 
Was Pendergrass truly an “aberration”—so out of step with the law 
that the California Supreme Court was waiting for an opportunity to 
overturn its ruling? Possibly. The court could have easily found Riverisland 
to be a case of fraud in the execution without disturbing Pendergrass. 
However, overturning long-standing precedent is quite rare, especially in 
a unanimous decision. This clear consensus might also seem somewhat 
surprising considering the current makeup of the California Supreme 
Court: six of the seven current Supreme Court Justices were appointed 
by Republican Governors (Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Joyce Kennard, Marvin 
Baxter, Kathryn Werdegar, Ming Chin, and Carol Corrigan), and one 
was appointed by a Democrat (Goodwin Liu). Generally held notions 
suggest that Republicans are “pro-business” and Democrats are looking 
out more for “the little guy.” Thus, the makeup of the current California 
Supreme Court would be expected to be “pro-business,” however, the 
decision was more “pro-little-guy.” Perhaps, then, Riverisland was a 
logical decision based on a mechanical application of the statutes, case 
law, and scholarly analysis. 
There might be unstated reasons for the court’s decision. Justin 
Sweet of University of California Berkeley School of Law stated that 
perhaps the court’s holding in Pendergrass was due to “the court’s fear, 
engendered by the depression, that a contrary holding would enable 
borrowers to evade their obligations.”173 A possible unstated reason for 
the Riverisland decision could be based on the blame placed on banks for 
the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008.174 Many banks gave loans to 
debtors that the banks knew could not afford them and then foreclosed 
when the borrowers could not make the required payments. In 
Riverisland, the bank modified the Workmans’ loan while allegedly 
fraudulently misrepresenting the agreement, only to initiate foreclosure 
proceedings on them a few months later. The Riverisland court might 
have recognized, and not wanted to sanction, such fraudulent dealings. 
Whatever the ultimate reason, Riverisland brings with it both problems 
and positive effects. 
A. Problems with Allowing Promissory Fraud that Contradicts 
the Written Agreement 
A verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. 
 
 172. Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P. 342, 345 (Cal. 1928). 
 173. Sweet, supra note 3, at 893. 
 174. See generally Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Final Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of 
the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States 
(2011); Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2011, at A1. 
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—Samuel Goldwyn175 
Riverisland’s ruling, which allows parol evidence of fraudulent 
statements that directly contradict the writing, appeals to our sense of 
morals. A drafter that lies about the contents of a written agreement and 
induces a non-drafter to sign it should not be able to escape liability. 
Riverisland appears to be fair because this type of deceit is wrong, and 
the law should discourage such practices.176  
On the other hand, Riverisland arguably favors non-drafting parties 
by allowing them to introduce evidence that has not been memorialized 
in a written agreement. Allowing parol evidence of such statements 
presents a number of problems. Three main problems are: 
(1) unintentional—honestly made but erroneous—false claims from non-
drafters, (2) intentionally fabricated claims, and (3) unpredictable 
outcomes from triers of fact. 
1. Permits Unintentionally False Claims 
People only see what they are prepared to see. 
—Ralph Waldo Emerson177 
Claims might arise from genuine misunderstandings between the 
parties or honestly made but false allegations. For example, a non-
drafting party might bring a claim of promissory fraud, honestly thinking 
that the drafting party misrepresented the terms of the contract, when, in 
reality, the drafting party did no such thing. The mind is not flawless and 
might remember events incorrectly. 
People see things the way that they want—and the way that their 
brains are trained—to see them. A “schema” is a mental shortcut based 
on a quick analysis of past similarities to previous information.178 
“Memory shaping” is the idea that a schema shapes how information is 
stored and also influences how it is retrieved from memory.179 A person’s 
 
 175. This quotation is attributed to Samuel Goldwyn, however, it is a misreporting of his actual 
quotation: “His verbal contract is worth more than the paper it’s written on.” Paul F. Boller, Jr. & 
John George, They Never Said It 42 (1989). 
 176. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 72. 
 177. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Emerson in His Journals 514 (1982). 
 178. Humans receive a lot of new information every day, and because of this, the brain creates 
mental short cuts in attempt to remember it all. These short cuts help us categorize new experiences so 
that our brain does not have to create a new “mental file folder” for every piece of new information. 
Our minds scan the new experience for similarities to past events and knowledge. Then, the new 
events get placed in an already created mental folder that correlates with the new data. These 
categories that our brains create are called scripts and schemas—mental short-cuts based on a quick 
analysis of similarities to previous information. This process is mostly unconscious and happens 
quickly. A script is based on a person’s previous experiences and is the order in which they think 
things occur. Sunwolf, Practical Jury Dynamics 124–25 (2004). 
 179. Id. at 130–31. 
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mind is schema-consistent and does not easily remember details from a 
different perspective.180 Perseverance and strengthening of schemas occur 
as well-developed schemas resist change and become more powerful 
over time.181 People also tend to forget inconsistencies, over-interpret 
consistencies, and favor memories that are consistent with their 
schemas.182  
A non-drafting party might remember certain statements as being in 
her favor because she has bolstered them to be consistent with her 
schema.183 Thus, even a non-drafting party with honest intentions can 
make mistakes. After Riverisland, and given the effects of memory 
shaping, permitting parol evidence of alleged misrepresentations might 
increase the number of lawsuits that are not factually justified, and such 
litigation can take years. For example, the Riverisland action began in 
2008, the California Supreme Court gave its decision five years later in 
2013, and the case is still active on remand. 
2. Encourages Intentionally Fabricated Claims 
Pendergrass implemented a duty-to-read rule, which barred 
extrinsic statements from evidence, even if they might have been made 
with fraudulent intent. Stewart Macaulay of University of Wisconsin Law 
School notes that, when a court has a duty-to-read rule, “one senses that 
the court is concerned with the likelihood of perjury and the difficulties 
of adjudicating facts” because “[i]t is easy to make up a story about one’s 
assumptions that are contradicted by a written contract.”184 For example, 
the Seventh Circuit, in both Rissman v. Rissman and Carr v. CIGNA 
Securities, Inc., acknowledged the concern regarding intentionally 
fabricated claims.185 In Rissman, Judge Frank Easterbrook stated that a 
non-reliance clause “ensures that both the transaction and any subsequent 
litigation proceed on the basis of the parties’ writings, which are less 
subject to the vagaries of memory and the risks of fabrication.”186 In Carr, 
Judge Richard Posner stated that the written agreement controls over 
 
 180. See id. at 131. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some 
Implications for the Study of Person Memory and Interpersonal Judgments, 38 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 841, 854–55 (1980). This is also known as the “self-serving bias.” Ward Farnsworth, The 
Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 567, 570 (2003). 
 183. See Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Memory plays tricks. Acting in 
the best of faith, people may ‘remember’ things that never occurred but now serve their interests. Or 
they may remember events with a change of emphasis or nuance that makes a substantial difference to 
meaning.”); see also Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 131. 
 184. Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, 
the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051, 1065 (1966). 
 185. Rissman, 213 F.3d at 384; Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 186. Rissman, 213 F.3d at 384. 
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alleged inconsistent prior representations because, otherwise, “sellers 
would have no protection against plausible liars and gullible jurors.”187 A 
party that later becomes dissatisfied with the agreement might attempt to 
void her contract by alleging that the drafting party made prior 
misrepresentations. Under Riverisland, such evidence of alleged prior 
statements is now allowed.188 
Riverisland changes Pendergrass’s more general rule—barring 
evidence of promissory fraud that is made prior to and is inconsistent with 
the written agreement—to a more case-by-case analysis in which such 
evidence is admissible. Moving “from relatively general rules to case-by-
case standards” increases the involvement of triers of fact.189 If judges and 
juries were always able to identify fabricated claims, this would not be a 
problem because claimants would have less incentive to bring such 
claims.190 “Defendants would know they would always prevail in litigation, 
ensuring that plaintiffs bringing such claims would receive negative 
payoffs. With this knowledge, few plaintiffs would bring such cases, and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers working on a contingent-fee basis would avoid them.”191 
Because the trier of fact will not always be able to tell the real 
claims from the fabricated ones, there will be error. Corbin stated that 
the PER might have been based in part as a way to control the jury.192 
Corbin contended that some courts prohibited evidence that 
contradicted the writing because such evidence was likely intentionally 
or unintentionally false, and there was a fear that the jury would consider 
it credible out of sympathy for “the little guy.”193 Charles McCormick of 
University of Texas School of Law agreed and noted that the “average 
jury will, other things being equal, lean strongly in favor of the side which 
is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by the 
enforcement of the writing.”194 Juries might be overly sympathetic to 
non-drafting parties that they think were taken advantage of by the 
drafting parties.195 Thus, some plaintiffs will have an incentive to make up 
claims—now admissible under Riverisland—knowing that a sympathetic 
jury will likely believe them. 
Jurors might also be more sympathetic to the underdog given 
current events and recent history. A lot of blame has been placed on 
 
 187. Carr, 95 F.3d at 547. 
 188. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 325 (2013). 
 189. Macaulay, supra note 184, at 1066. 
 190. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 72. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Corbin, supra note 20, at 608. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the 
Jury, 41 Yale. L.J. 365, 366 (1931). 
 195. Id. 
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banks for the subprime mortgage crisis.196 Although jurors generally vary 
on whether they are pro-little-guy or pro-business, jurors might presently 
be more sympathetic to the little-guy debtor given the country’s recent 
recession. Whether or not the Credit Association made the alleged 
misrepresentations in the Workmans’ case, jurors in other cases might be 
inclined to believe that the non-drafting parties were taken advantage of 
by the drafting parties because they do not want to sanction potentially 
fraudulent dealings. 
Furthermore, even if the truthful drafting party prevails, there is still 
the high cost of litigation.197 Many parties will want to avoid litigation, as 
it involves considerable time, money, and risk of an adverse judgment. 
This gives leverage to the plaintiffs—including those who have 
intentionally fabricated claims—to get the defendants to renegotiate the 
terms of the agreement, rescind the contract, or settle.198 If the parties do 
end up in court, however, they will face uncertain outcomes from juries. 
3. Risks Unpredictable Outcomes From Juries 
There is no such thing as an impartial jury because there are no 
impartial people. 
—Jon Stewart199 
Perception is ubiquitous as it relates to humans and, more 
specifically, as it relates to jurors. Under a Pendergrass-like rule, a judge 
would likely dismiss a claim or grant summary judgment against a party 
that claimed prior fraudulent misrepresentations inconsistent with the 
writing. In the case of the Workmans, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for the Credit Association, holding that the fraud exception did 
not include parol evidence that was inconsistent with the written 
agreement.200 After Riverisland, decisions about alleged factual 
misrepresentations will be left to juries. Instead of relying on the written 
word of a contract, evidence will now be “he said, she said” arguments for 
the jury to decide who they deem believable. 
In the courtroom, lawyers act as message senders and jurors act as 
evidence receivers. There are numerous receiver-centered variables that 
a juror holds when interpreting evidence presented at trial.201 Jurors 
 
 196. See generally supra note 174. 
 197. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 72. 
 198. See Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust: Should No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for Fraudulent 
Inducement of Contract?, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 423, 468–69 (2009) (explaining that a holdup by a party 
alleging fraud is a reason for the other party to want to have no-reliance clauses included and enforced 
in its contracts). 
 199. Judy Brown, Joke Express: Instant Delivery of 1,424 Funny Bits from the Best 
Comedians 136 (2007). 
 200. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 318 (2013). 
 201. Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 119. 
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perceive other people (witnesses, plaintiffs, defendants, and lawyers), 
objects, and things through mental filters and “psychosocial-noises.”202 
These noises are the variables through which the receiver views the 
message. Some of these noises include: prior experiences, beliefs, gender, 
memory, physical attractiveness, race, and snap judgments.203 These 
noises make up the “social perceptual lenses” through which each juror 
will look at the trial and are the cause of many perceptual errors.204 All of 
the evidence presented is filtered through the juror’s “socialized gender, 
cultural values (including organizational, community, religious, or ethnic 
cultures), and attribution-making processes (personal theories about 
what causes a thing to happen).”205 Basically, what a juror hears gets 
filtered and thus distorted through these noises, leaving a different 
message than the lawyer actually sent. 
After Riverisland, judges must permit parol evidence of alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentations that directly contradicts the writing. Now, 
instead of relying on the written word of the contract, courts will rely on 
jurors—whose mental filters and psychosocial-noises could distort their 
views of the evidence, not to mention their views of the plaintiffs, 
defendants, lawyers, and witnesses. Academics have conducted a 
substantial amount of research about the effects of these psychosocial 
noises in the legal system. Physical attractiveness and race, two of the 
most visible and obviously available traits of individuals, are examples of 
psychosocial-noises that play a role in the courtroom.206 The effects of 
physical attractiveness and race reside mostly on a subconscious level. 
Most people would say that physical attractiveness is a superficial quality 
and that it does not bias them in any way.207 Similarly, most people do not 
consider themselves, or would not admit to being, racist. However, it 
seems that people grossly underestimate the influence that physical 
attractiveness and race have on them.208 
Physical attractiveness greatly affects “person perception”—how 
individuals think about other people and how they judge others’ internal 
 
 202. Id. at 119–21. 
 203. See id. at 119. 
 204. Id. at 122. 
 205. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 206. This research relies heavily on mock juries, as performing experimental research in actual 
trials could have detrimental consequences to obtaining justice. This research, however, has its 
limitation because much of it does not include the deliberation stage in the study. 
 207. Gordon L. Patzer, The Power and Paradox of Physical Attractiveness 44 (2006). 
 208. A major reason for this is because they are socialized biases originating from childhood. See 
generally T.G. Power, K.A. Hildebrandt & H.E. Fitzgerald, Adults’ Responses to Infants Varying in 
Facial Expression and Perceived Attractiveness, 5 Infant Behav. & Dev. 33 (1982). A major reason for 
this is because they are socialized biases. Id. 
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and external qualities.209 The “Physical Attractiveness Phenomena” is the 
notion that, in general, physically attractive people receive more positive 
responses than their less attractive counterparts.210 These subconscious 
biases translate to the courtroom in both civil and criminal cases. In mock 
civil trials, jurors gave physically attractive plaintiffs more favorable 
judgments, including rewarding higher monetary damages,211 and, in 
criminal settings, jurors gave more lenient sentences to physically 
attractive defendants.212 Another study suggests that, if physical 
attractiveness was used in any way to commit the crime or fraudulent act, 
being good-looking might be detrimental to the defendant.213 
In addition, many studies have considered the role of race in the 
courtroom. Most people have implicit, unconscious preferences for their 
own race.214 In his book, Blink, Malcolm Gladwell asserts that we have our 
conscious attitudes—what we choose to believe and how we choose to 
act—and our unconscious attitudes—our immediate, automatic 
associations that we make without thinking.215 These unconscious attitudes 
are largely based on past experiences, relationships with others, and the 
media.216 In the legal context, a juror is more likely to find a defendant 
civilly liable when the defendant is of a different race than the juror.217 A 
juror is also likely to be more lenient on a defendant of her same race.218 
Physical attractiveness and race are just two examples of 
psychosocial-noises that jurors bring to the courtroom that impact their 
judgments and, ultimately, their verdicts. Each juror is unique, and all 
jurors come to a trial with different backgrounds, beliefs, and expectations. 
Riverisland is significant because jurors, with all of their biases, will now 
decide the credibility of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Judges will 
no longer be able to exclude evidence of alleged prior misrepresentations 
that is inconsistent with the writing. Riverisland moves us away from 
 
 209. See generally R. Tagiuri, Person Perception, in 2 Handbook of Social Psychology (G. 
Lindzey & E. Aronson eds, 1954). 
 210. Patzer, supra note 207, at 20–21. 
 211. Id. at 275. 
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relying on the written word of the contract bargained for by both parties 
to allowing jurors, who likely cannot be impartial, to determine its 
meaning and what happened. Furthermore, because each juror views the 
trial differently and pays attention to what she deems important, an 
“evidence gap” often occurs.219 The human mind cannot possibly remember 
it all and remember it correctly. 
B. Positive Effects of Allowing Promissory Fraud that 
Contradicts the Written Agreement 
There seems to be an easy fix for non-drafting parties to avoid being 
taken advantage of: read the contract. However, the duty-to-read rule 
came from bargaining practices of a different era “when the self-reliance 
ethic was strong and standardized agreements were rare.”220 Times have 
changed. Russell Korobkin of University of California, Los Angeles 
School of Law asserts that implementing a “pure duty-to-read rule” 
would not serve as an effective solution because it increases the direct 
and indirect costs, and reduces the social value, of contracting.221 He 
asserts that these costs arise due to the complexity of contracts, 
confirmation and status quo biases, and the potential to undermine 
trust.222 Korobkin states that this rule would require non-drafting parties 
to painstakingly read contracts to protect themselves against exploiting 
drafting parties, cause non-drafters to take substantial risks by not 
reading their contracts, or cause them to avoid contracting all together.223 
He contends that each option reduces the social value of contracting, as 
“the costs borne by nondrafting parties under a pure duty-to-read rule 
would ultimately be shared by their contracting counterparts, to the 
detriment of all concerned.”224 Riverisland recognizes some of Korobkin’s 
concerns, as well as others. 
1. Recognizes Reality: No One Reads and Fully Understands 
Contracts 
I read part of it all the way through. 
—Samuel Goldwyn225 
 
 219. Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 123 (“There’s a real gap between the evidence that was 
presented at a trial and the evidence a juror perceives was presented at trial.”). 
 220. Perillo, supra note 21, § 29.12. 
 221. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 88. 
 222. Id. at 78–88. 
 223. Id. at 88. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Boller & George, supra note 175, at 42 (attributing this quotation to Samuel Goldwyn; 
however, he might not have actually said it). 
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The Riverisland rule recognizes a reality of everyday life: many 
people will not fully read a contract before signing it. In his article, which 
is highly critical of Pendergrass, Sweet states that the “argument that a 
party can protect himself by insisting on written promises shows a 
remarkable lack of awareness of the facts of everyday commercial life.”226 
One study found that about 1 in 1000 people scrolls through the online 
boilerplate contract when it is provided prior to accepting an online 
agreement.227 The one-in-one-thousand reader spent a median time of 
twenty-nine seconds “reading” the agreement.228 The median length of 
the boilerplate agreements was about 1700 words.229 In twenty-nine 
seconds, the average person can read only 150 words or less.230 Thus, 
given the complicated legalese in these agreements and the time spent 
reading them, readership of the contract is basically zero.231 As an 
anecdotal example, in an experiment by a software developer, PC 
Pitstop, the company put a clause in its user license agreement that 
promised $1000 to anyone who read it.232 After four months and more 
than 3000 downloads, someone finally wrote in.233 
In addition, the problem is not only reading the contract but also 
understanding it. Contracts are often long, complex, and written in legalese. 
Understanding the agreement might be time-consuming and difficult for 
the average person.234 Fully understanding the contract might require 
hiring a lawyer, which is, again, time-consuming, not to mention costly.235 
In Riverisland, the Workmans’ loan agreement was twenty-six 
single-spaced pages.236 That is almost twice as long as this Note and likely 
much more difficult to understand. In addition, the Workmans were 
renegotiating their loan agreement. It is possible that they thought that 
the only terms changing were the ones represented to them by the vice 
president of the Credit Association and, thus, there was no need to review 
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the document carefully. Although it might have been unreasonable for 
them not to read such an important contract (or at least the terms 
regarding the extension and additional collateral that they believed were 
changing), it is a reality of everyday life that people, like the Workmans, 
neglect to fully read and comprehend long, complex contracts. 
2. Discourages Fraudulent Practices of Drafting Parties and 
Recognizes Legislative Intent 
Pendergrass’s holding left non-drafting parties vulnerable. Under 
Pendergrass, a drafting party could make false representations and then 
later disclaim them in the written agreement without consequence. After 
Riverisland, non-drafting parties have more protection, or at least 
recourse, against this practice. Because of potential liability, drafting 
parties will be discouraged from making fraudulent statements. 
Riverisland is also consistent with the language of section 1856, 
which broadly permits parol evidence of fraud, because fraud invalidates 
the agreement. As the court in Riverisland stated, “Pendergrass failed to 
account for the fundamental principle that fraud undermines the 
essential validity of the parties’ agreement. When fraud is proven, it 
cannot be maintained that the parties freely entered into an agreement 
reflecting a meeting of the minds.”237 Thus, as the Legislature intended, 
any fraud voids a contract. 
3. Acknowledges Psychological Tendencies 
As previously discussed, people tend to look for evidence that 
supports their preexisting understandings and fail to notice evidence that 
does not.238 “Confirmation bias” is the psychological tendency to bolster 
current beliefs by seeking out consistent information and ignoring 
inconsistent information.239 Furthermore, people also tend to interpret 
ambiguous information as consistent, rather than inconsistent, with prior 
beliefs.240 This “selectivity of perception” is unavoidable.241 
Such selectivity creates a problem when a party reads over a 
document after being told—by someone that they have no reason to 
disbelieve—that the terms state one thing when they actually state 
another. One study examined the confirmation bias in participants 
 
 237. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324. 
 238. See Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 105. 
 239. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 
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 240. See id. 
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reviewing home-loan disclosure forms by tracking eye fixations.242 
Participants were randomly told their interest rate (e.g., 4%) or monthly 
payment (e.g., $2000) for their loan but, were not told that the quoted 
rate would only apply for a limited amount of time.243 If a confirmation 
bias existed, participants would look for information that confirmed their 
interest rate or monthly payment and not for information that would 
disconfirm it—i.e., the information that the loan adjusts.244 The results 
showed that 29% of those participants given the interest rate term and 
33% of those given the monthly payment term showed confirmation biases 
in their eye fixations.245 The percentages indicating confirmation bias 
increased further to 42% and 48%, respectively, when experimenters tried 
to engage the participants in conversation while they reviewed the forms.246 
In the case of the Workmans in Riverisland, they claimed not to 
have read the contract before signing. However, even if they had, the 
confirmation bias suggests that they would have tended to read the 
contract as being consistent with the Credit Association’s 
representations. Their prior beliefs from what the Credit Association had 
told them might have caused them to overlook any change in the terms. 
They might have confirmed their preexisting beliefs about the contract 
and signed anyway. Thus, because a fraudulent promise would have 
affected the Workmans’ reading of the contract, allowing evidence of the 
promissory fraud would at least help counteract the negative 
repercussions of having signed it. 
In addition, when presented with a contract, people often feel 
pressured to sign. By taking the time to read the contract carefully or 
asking to have extended time so that an attorney can review it, the non-
drafting party indicates that she does not completely trust the drafting 
party.247 On the other hand, a non-drafting party signals trust by signing a 
contract without reading it.248 Korobkin notes that most agreements are 
not just one-time transactions, but involve post-contractual performance 
on the part of one or both parties.249 In such circumstances, he notes that 
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“bonds of trust are likely to increase the chances that parties will engage 
in cooperative behavior that both maximizes the value of the deal and 
builds a basis for profitable cooperation in the future.”250 
In the Workmans’ case, they also might have felt a similar pressure 
to sign the agreement without reading it because of their ongoing 
relationship with the Credit Association. Because the Workmans were 
renegotiating their preexisting loan, they likely felt that they already 
understood most of the contract’s terms. Thus, the Workmans reading 
the entire agreement carefully would have signaled distrust of the Credit 
Association. The Workmans would also continue to work with the Credit 
Association, as a loan agreement requires post-contractual performance, 
and might have wanted to do future business with the Credit Association. 
Thus, the Workmans had incentives to cooperate and continue fostering 
a positive relationship. 
Another cognitive bias is the “status quo bias,” which is an irrational 
preference for the current state of affairs.251 Any change from a person’s 
current position is perceived as a loss. As an example, most employees 
do not to opt in to their employer’s 401(k) plan, but most employees do 
not opt out if their enrollment is automatic.252 
In Riverisland, the Workmans had a preexisting loan agreement 
with the Credit Association as part of their status quo. In working with 
the Credit Association to restructure their loan agreement, the Credit 
Association allegedly made misrepresentations about the agreement’s 
terms. By the time the Workmans signed the loan modification, the 
contract had become part of their status quo. Not signing would have 
been perceived as a loss. Thus, if the drafting party makes favorable 
representations and then disclaims them later in writing, it is more likely 
that the non-drafting party will sign the contract because getting the deal 
is already part of her status quo. 
Finally, the “overconfidence effect” is a bias whereby a person’s 
subjective confidence in her decisions is higher than her objective 
accuracy.253 The overconfidence effect might also increase the force of 
“escalating commitment.”254 “Escalation of commitment,” or the “sunk 
cost fallacy,” occurs when people rationalize their increased investment 
in a course of action based on their total prior investment, ignoring 
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evidence that the cost now outweighs the anticipated benefit.255 When 
threatened with foreclosure of one’s home, it is likely that a party would 
be willing to do most anything to keep that from happening. It is also 
likely that evidence of the risk or cost of saving one’s home might 
actually outweigh the anticipated benefit. 
In the case of Riverisland, the Workmans might have rationalized 
renegotiating their loan with additional collateral, thinking that it was 
necessary to save their home and that they would find a way to make the 
payments. Whether the Credit Association told them that their new 
agreement included two or eight properties as collateral, the 
overconfidence effect suggests that they might have agreed to it either 
way. However, if the Credit Association really did make favorable 
representations and then disclaim them later in writing, the overconfident 
Workmans might have overlooked the significance of the change, ignoring 
the evidence that the cost now outweighed the anticipated benefit. 
V.  Balancing the Interests of Drafting and Non-Drafting 
Parties 
Pendergrass favored drafting parties. Riverisland now tips the scale 
in favor of non-drafting parties. Drafters can either bear these risks and 
costs (paying for occasional losses), try to mitigate them (sustaining 
transaction costs in the process), or avoid them (not entering into 
contracts).256 Any of these three options, however, creates an “implicit 
tax on contracting.”257 Basically, the drafting party’s cost of contracting 
has gone up while its value of contracting has gone down. It is difficult to 
find a solution that does not compromise one party over the other. On 
the one hand, it is important to encourage people to read and understand 
their contracts. On the other hand, courts should not tolerate fraudulent 
practices. 
Some scholars have argued for use of a “sophisticated-
unsophisticated” distinction because it takes into account the bargaining 
power and experience of the respective parties.258 Sophisticated parties 
would be bound by the terms of the written agreement and prohibited 
from bringing in parol evidence.259 Unsophisticated parties, on the other 
hand, would be permitted to bring in parol evidence to show that a 
 
 255. Id. 
 256. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 76. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See, e.g., Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1059–60 (Del. Ch. 
2006); Macklin, supra note 6, at 833–36; Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to 
Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 
617, 624 (2009). 
 259. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 91. 
M - LaRocca_13 (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:36 PM 
612 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:581 
 
drafting party made prior inconsistent promises.260 As Korobkin points 
out, however, the problem with a sophisticated-unsophisticated 
distinction is that it creates one rule for sophisticated parties and another 
for unsophisticated parties, and no practical way to contract for 
something else.261 He notes that even sophisticated parties can be taken 
advantage of by a contract being inconsistent with prior 
misrepresentations, and it sometimes works in an unsophisticated party’s 
favor to be able to consent to certain disclaimers of terms.262 
New York decisional law provides a step in the right direction 
toward a workable compromise by requiring meaningful assent in the 
form of a signature next to specific disclaimers of prior representations. 
In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
made oral misrepresentations about the operating expenses and 
profitability of the purchased building.263 The contract contained a specific 
disclaimer, which stated that: (1) the seller had not made “any 
representations as to the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses, 
operation or any other matter or thing affecting or related to the aforesaid 
premises,” (2) the purchaser “expressly acknowledges that no such 
representations have been made,” and (3) the purchaser “acknowledges 
that it has inspected the premises and agrees to take the premises ‘as is.’”264 
The court noted that a general merger clause would not bar evidence of 
fraud, but this specific disclaimer destroyed the plaintiff’s allegations that 
he relied on contrary oral representations.265 The court stated that the 
plaintiff had “in the plainest language announced and stipulated that it is 
not relying on any representations as to the very matter as to which it now 
claims it was defrauded.”266 The court said that if the language used in this 
case was not specific enough to avoid claims of fraudulent representations, 
“then no language [could] accomplish that purpose.”267 
Building on New York’s requirement of specific disclaimer, 
California courts should consider recognizing meaningful assent to the 
terms of an agreement if the drafting party provides a one-page summary 
of the key terms in the document and specific disclaimers of any prior 
representations. Preferably, this summary page would be the first page of 
the contract, be written in plain English, and require a signature. This 
page would be beneficial to both non-drafting and drafting parties: it 
 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 91. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. 1959). 
 264. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 265. Id. at 599. 
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. at 600. 
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would help non-drafting parties understand the major terms of their 
contracts, and drafting parties could show that the non-drafter knew that 
any prior representations regarding specific terms were being disclaimed. 
This summary/disclaimer page should be short, simple, and specific. 
First, the summary/disclaimer page should be short. Most people are 
not willing to read entire standard form contracts that are long and full of 
terms that deal with unlikely contingencies. One study asked students in 
Bachelors and Masters degree programs whether they would read 
various types of contracts.268 One of the scenarios tested was that of 
opening up a bank account.269 Researchers found that ninety-two percent 
of the respondents indicated that they would not read the entire contract, 
while forty-seven percent said that they would read parts of it or skim it 
prior to signing.270 This indicates that people are willing to spend some 
time to try and understand their contracts but are less willing to read 
them in their entirety. However, if a drafting party just asks the non-
drafter to quickly initial or sign paragraphs that have been tabbed in a long 
document, the non-drafter might still feel pressure to just sign without fully 
reading those paragraphs.271 Therefore, instead of just calling a person’s 
attention to specific areas of the document, drafting parties could have a 
one-page summary of the crucial terms and disclaimers. 
Second, the summary/disclaimer page should be simple. Mandated 
disclosures or disclaimers regarding the terms of a contract often fail 
because they are too complex and difficult to understand.272 The 
summary/disclaimer page should be written in plain English so that the 
non-drafting party can understand the main terms of the contract. One 
study showed that borrowers better understood a simplified Truth in 
Lending Act mortgage form compared to the mandated one.273 On 
average, participants given the mandated disclosure form only answered 
sixty-one percent of the questions about the loan terms correctly, 
whereas those given the simplified prototype form answered eighty-
percent correctly.274 Simple information facilitates understanding. 
 
 268. Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: Misguided 
Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 199, 209 (2010). 
 269. Id. at 210. 
 270. Id. at 213. 
 271. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 95–96. 
 272. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 231, at 743 (suggesting that mandated disclosures 
often fail because “length, complexity, and difficulty are the enemies of successful mandates. This 
suggests that brief, simple, easy disclosures are at least preferable”). 
 273. James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer 
Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment with 
Mortgage Borrowers, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 516, 518–19 (2010). 
 274. Id. 
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Third, the summary/disclaimer page should be specific. Specificity 
provides notice to the non-drafting party of the particular important 
terms and disclaimers and protection to the drafting party against 
admission of evidence of alleged prior misrepresentations inconsistent 
with the writing. If the disclaimers are specific, like in Danann, then the 
drafting party should be able to exclude evidence of alleged prior 
misrepresentations. As stated in Danann, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to 
say that it is impossible for two businessmen dealing at arm’s length to 
agree that the buyer is not buying in reliance on any representations of the 
seller as to a particular fact.”275 
The summary/disclaimer page would foster transparency. Placing 
the critical information on one page would make it extremely easy for a 
non-drafter to understand the critical terms and disclaimers of the 
contract. At the same time, it would help protect drafters by prohibiting 
potentially biasing evidence of alleged prior misrepresentations by a non-
drafter. The summary/disclaimer page solution recognizes the reality that 
people do not read long, complex contracts and holds parties 
accountable for the agreements into which they freely enter. If a drafting 
party includes such a page, California courts should find mutual assent as 
to a contract’s terms and specific disclaimers and preclude evidence of 
promissory fraud that is at variance with those terms. 
Conclusion 
The California Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riverisland 
overturned Pendergrass and, now, evidence of promissory fraud that is at 
variance with the terms of the writing is admissible. The decision creates 
a clear rule consistent with the language of section 1856. Its application is 
beneficial given the fact that many people do not read or understand the 
contracts that they sign and psychological biases play a role in perception 
and decisionmaking. The precedent set by Riverisland, however, exposes 
drafting parties to intentionally and unintentionally fabricated claims from 
non-drafting parties. Drafting parties are also at risk of unpredictable 
outcomes from juries who might be swayed by testimony of alleged 
fraudulent promises. 
Riverisland’s standard favors non-drafting parties and shifts the cost 
of contracting from non-drafting parties to drafting parties. To protect 
against promissory fraud claims, drafting parties could obtain meaningful 
assent by having the non-drafting party sign the one page of the contract 
that contains both a summary of its key terms and specific disclaimers of 
any prior representations regarding those terms. At the same time, this 
 
 275. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 600 (N.Y. 1959). 
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summary/disclaimer page would aid non-drafting parties in 
understanding the major terms of their contracts. 
So what about the Workmans? Had there been such a one-page 
summary/disclaimer, would they have read it and uncovered the alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentations? Given the studies discussed supra that 
suggest that most people are willing to take the time to skim an entire 
contract before signing it, it seems likely that they would have taken the 
time to read that one page. Had they done so, they most likely would have 
discovered any inconsistencies. Perhaps the Credit Association might also 
have been discouraged from even making any misrepresentations, had it 
planned on including such a summary/disclaimer page. On the other hand, 
what if the Credit Association did not make any misrepresentations and 
it was the Workmans who made an intentional or unintentional false 
claim? Then, the Credit Association would have been able to use the 
summary/disclaimer page to preclude any representations specifically 
disclaimed by the Workmans. In either scenario, the parties would have 
avoided costly litigation. 
 
